Growing Support for Irish Re-unification

The North and South series is a collaboration between The Irish Times and ARINS (Analysing and Researching Ireland North and South), a joint research project of the Royal Irish Academy (RIA) and the Keough-Naughton Centre for Irish Studies at the University of Notre Dame. For three years now it has been publishing simultaneous surveys of Ireland, north and south, on attitudes to reunification as well as some more qualitative studies. The 2024 surveys, just published, were conducted by Ipsos and surveyed more than 1,000 voters at multiple points across both jurisdictions and yielded the following results:

Basically, support for re-unification has remained roughly constant in the south, at 64-66%, over the last three years. In Northern Ireland, it has grown steadily from 27% (2022) to 30% (2023) and now 34% (2024). Among Northern Catholics it has grown from 55% to 63%, but even among Northern Protestants, it has grown from 4% to 7% in 2024. The gap between the pro-Union side and pro-reunification side has shrunk from 23% to 14% in three years. At that rate of decline, it will take 6 years, until 2030, for that gap to close entirely.

Of course, as they say in all the best financial advice, past performance is no guarantee of future performance. There is no reason to assume that the factors which have pushed more and more people into supporting a United Ireland will continue to do so into the future. Perhaps the outworkings of Brexit have had a once off effect. On the other hand, there is no sign of a major upturn in the UK’s fortunes, or of austerity and political dysfunctionality not continuing in Northern Ireland.

Nationalists are frequently criticised for not reaching out to unionists more, but there is zero sign of political unionism reaching out to nationalism in order to increase the base of support for the Union. The whole basis of DUP, TUV and UUP politics appears to be about trying to mobilise and consolidate unionist support for the Union, not trying to recruit nationalist or “other” voters to their cause. The rise in support for a United Ireland even among northern protestants seems to indicate they are failing in even that limited objective.

The Good Friday Agreement criterion for holding a border poll (that a majority would “probably” vote in favour) has clearly not yet been met, but Northern Protestants have grown more open to one being held, with 44% in favour, to 37% against. They are also much more disposed to accept the result if there was a majority for re-unification, with only 20% finding such an outcome “almost impossible to accept” compared to 32% in 2022. “Loser’s consent” among Protestants has grown from 62% in 2022 to 77% in 2024 if you combine those who would “happily accept” the result with those who “could live with it”.

Of course, these polls have been taken in the absence of any concrete proposals for what re-unification would look like. The survey goes on to ask whether a United Ireland should join NATO.

19% in the Republic agree a United Ireland should join NATO, whereas 49% are opposed. In Northern Ireland 43% think a United Ireland should join NATO, with 25% opposed, although it is notable that only 12% in Northern Ireland, and 7% in the Republic take a hard line on this and think Ireland should “definitely join.” Northern Ireland Catholics are more favourably disposed to joining NATO than their southern counterparts (31% for, to 35% against), and 55% of Northern Ireland Protestants are broadly in favour. But with only 14% of Northern Ireland Protestants taking a hard line of this and saying a United Ireland should definitely join NATO, it doesn’t seem to be a deal breaker for the vast majority especially when you consider 14% of Protestants also say a United Ireland should not join NATO.

Negative attitudes to NATO are correlated with gender, age and location, with women, younger voters and urban voters taking more negative attitudes generally – except in the North where gender is less of a factor. With increased urbanisation and younger voters coming to the fore, it seems unlikely that attitudes to NATO will become any more positive going forward.

Attitudes to the Commonwealth, even though it is a much less substantial organisation than NATO, are even less positive, however, perhaps because it is considered a British rather than US led organisation.

Only 11% in the south and 34% in the North think a United Ireland should join/re-join with 67% and 33% against, respectively. That figure rises to 52% to 18% majority among Protestants, but there is a 17% to 49% majority against joining amongst Catholics and a 22% to 33% majority against joining amongst “others”.

Attitudes to joining either NATO or the Commonwealth are strongly correlated with party support, however, with NATO much more popular than the Commonwealth with all bar unionist party supporters, and especially amongst Alliance Party supporters, where only 28% support Commonwealth membership.

In summary, strong majorities in the south are against NATO (19% to 49%) and Commonwealth membership (11% to 67%) while in the North opinion on NATO is 43% to 25% in favour and essentially tied (34% to 33%) on Commonwealth membership. One could expect these figures to change if the positive trend in growing support for a United Ireland is maintained, and if the debate around NATO membership – with President Trump threatening to withdraw support – intensifies. With full EU membership being part of any re-unification deal, and the EU talking on an increasing role in EU defence, it is possible these debates will be overtaken by events in any case.

However, with few voters north or south taking a hard line opinion in favour of both NATO or Commonwealth membership, and only DUP and UUP voters strongly in favour, it is unlikely that an Irish government would be keen to offer these concessions unless there was a specific objective to appease DUP or UUP voters. The surveys don’t ask the question whether such concessions would sway many DUP/UUP supporters vote on a border poll, but I personally very much doubt that they would. It could also put the passing of any referendum in the south very much at risk.

It is also possible that the British and Irish governments would agree a new mutual cooperation treaty in advance of a border poll, formalising existing security and military cooperation and intensifying cooperation in areas such as renewable energy, infrastructural development, civil service transfers, pensions, social welfare, taxation, economic development, education, health, veterinary care and other areas not directly impinging on EU competencies. The UK is currently seeking improved cooperation with the EU in any case, and there are many aspects of current east west cooperation – such as the Common Travel Area and informal security and defence cooperation which might benefit from a more formal statutory and/or treaty foundation.

There is widespread agreement that the Brexit referendum and aftermath became poisonous because of a lack of clarity and planning for what Brexit would actually entail.

When asked about the importance of planning for a United Ireland 65% of survey respondents in the south rated it as very important compared to 60% in the North –  made up of 79% for northern Catholics, 38% for northern Protestants and 70% for others. The authors commented that:

“Few unionists want to see Irish unity come about. However, almost four in 10 (38 per cent) voters in the North from a Protestant background said that it was important that there is preparation for the possibility of a united Ireland.”

Contingency planning for all manner of possibilities and disasters is the norm in business and governance. It doesn’t mean that you want to see those disasters or other events coming about.

Thus, while 38% of northern Protestants see planning for a United Ireland is important, 83% don’t see achieving a United Ireland as a priority. This compares to 63% for “others”, and 20% of northern Catholics and 51% in the north as a whole. This compares to 22% in the south who don’t see it as a priority, compared to 61% who do. Someone should tell the Irish government and the political parties, as hardly any majored on the United Ireland issue in the recent general election.

When broken down by political party support, planning for a United Ireland is seen as far more important in the north than in the south, with almost as many DUP supporters (12%) and UUP supporters (14%) seeing it to be extremely important as Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (both 22%). 38% of Alliance Party supporters see planning for a United Ireland as being extremely important – more even than Sinn Féin supporters (34%) in the south!

Remarkably, only 43% Sinn Féin supporters in the north rated achieving a United Ireland as “extremely important” although it is not clear whether that wording applied to now or at some time in the future. Unsurprisingly, hardly any unionist party supporters rated it as extremely important, but only 19% of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael supporters and 20% of SDLP supporters did so now. Some more clarity on the context and wording of that question would be useful, but in general Fianna Fáil Fine Gael, and Sinn Féin (south) supporters gave the same answers as regard to planning and achieving, indicating that the saw the planning process and achieving process as much the same thing which should be happening now.

It seems clear from the overall context that planning is something that is regarded as important by 60-65% of respondents, north and south, and that no referendum should be held until a clear plan has been developed. Opinions vary as to the priority that should be given to such planning, but even 38% of northern Protestants think that that is important. Unionist parties who refuse to engage with such contingency planning for fear of increasing the likelihood of it occurring should bear in mind that 38% of northern Protestants do not agree with them on that.

But the biggest lesson is for the Irish government. The vast majority, north and south, want to see a clear and detailed plan for re-unification before they even consider the prospect of voting in a border poll. With the majority for the current Union having declined from 23% to 14% in the north in just the last three years, the prospects for a border poll in the next few years is increasing, and the time to start the planning for that at official government level is now – possibly in conjunction with a British government anxious for better relations with Ireland and the EU.

We live in very uncertain times. A little more cooperation, certainty, and stability on the island of Ireland and in our relationship with our neighbouring island would not go  amiss and would be for the benefit of all living on these islands.

Frank Schnittger is the author of Sovereignty 2040, a future history of how Irish re-unification might work out. He has worked in business in Dublin and London and, on a voluntary basis, for charities in community development, education, restorative justice and addiction services.